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 REASON AND BELIEF: THE BAYLE-JACQUELOT DEBATE
 by Ruth Whelan
 Comme M. Bayle n'est pas un antagoniste
 du commun, les plus savantes plumes de l'Eu-
 rope se sont essayées à le réfuter.
 Encyclopédie1
 Il seroit à souhaiter que Mr Jaquelot [...]
 eût avec l'esprit et le feu que tout le monde
 lui reconnoit, cette fine logique qui fait l'a-
 vantage du philosophe de Rotterdam.
 Israël-Antoine Aufrère2
 The Huguenot pastor, Isaac Jacquelot3, if he is remembered at all, is re-
 garded today as the prolix and little read opponent of Pierre Bayle, author
 1. «Manichéisme» (Y von), Encyclopédie , ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences ,
 des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres , 35 vols (Paris: Briasson,
 1751-1780), X: 24b.
 2. Israël-Antoine Aufrère (1677-1758), letter from London, dated 20/31 août 1706,
 addrressed to J.-A. Turrettini, E. de Budé (ed.), Lettres inédites adressés [...] à
 J.-A. Turrettini , 3 vols. (Paris/Genève: Librairie de la Suisse française et Libraire
 Jules Carey, 1887) 1:66.
 3. Son of a Calvinist minister, Isaac Jacquelot was born in Vassy (Calvados,
 France) on 16/26, December 1647. He studied at the Academies of Saumur and
 Sedan and served the church of his native town but left France at the time of
 the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). He went first to Heidelberg, where
 he was the guest of the Dowager Electress Palatine and, in April 1686 he was
 appointed to an honorary pastorate in The Hague, a position he held until 1702.
 During his time there, he was accused of Socinianism and Sabellianism by Pierre
 Jurieu who had him cited at the Walloon synod in Leiden in 1691. Jacquelot was
 later cleared of the charges. In the summer of 1702, he accepted the call of Frederick
 I to serve the French church in Berlin. He died in that city on the 15/25 October
 1708. Very little has been written on Jacquelot's life and work. The most complete
 and relatively correct biographical notice was written by the abbé G.L.C. Pérau
 and published as a forward to Jacquelot's Dissertations sur l'existence de Dieu ,
 3 vols. (Paris: F. Didot & J. Barois, 1744), I: XLI-XCII. This is the main source
 for the notices in J.-G. de Chaufepié, Nouveau dictionnaire historique et critique ,
 4 vols. (Amsterdam/La Haye: Z. Châtelain, H. Uytwerf and others, 1750-1756),
 III: 10-12 and E. & E. Haag, La France protestante , 10 vols. (Paris/Genève: Joël
 Cherbuliez, 1846-1859), VI: 36a-39a. I have as yet been unable to consult D. Du-
 rand, La Vie d'Isaac Jacquelot (Londres: P. Elmsly, 1785). For his apologetics,
 Rivista di storia della filosofìa n. 1, 1993
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 of the Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697 and 1702) and other works
 which caused so much contention in the learned circles of early modern
 Europe4. Jacqueloťs critique of Bayle contributed, as we know, to the
 intellectual divisions of the Huguenot diaspora, the split bwtween the so-
 called «rationaux» and «anti-rationaux»5; in other words, the Bayle-
 Jacquelot debate was part of the wider question of «l'accord de la religion
 et de la raison»6. Less appreciated, perhaps, is the way this debate bet-
 ween Huguenots was woven into the complex network of philosophies
 hich inform the Encyclopédie1. Certain key articles concerning the phi-
 losophy of religion, written by Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey and Claude
 Yvon8, not only mention Jacquelot by name, they also use his arguments
 and reflect his confidence in the proofs of Christianity and in the «the
 compatibility of revelation and reason»9. The reader's confidence is deli-
 berately undermined, however, by a cross-reference to another article, writ-
 ten by d'Alembert, which is «sceptical as to the value of these proofs»10
 see A. McKenna, De Pascal à Voltaire: le rôle des «Pensées» de Pascal dans l'histoi-
 re des idées entre 1670 et 1734 , 2 vols. (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1990),
 1:544-50; A. Monod, De Pascal à Chateaubriand: les défenseurs français du christia-
 nisme de 1670 à 1802 (Geneva: Slatkine reprints 1970), 40, 161-67, 191, 205, 233;
 P. Vernière, Spinoza et la pensée française avant la Révolution (Paris: Presses Uni-
 versitaires de France, 1982), 64-68.
 4. Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique , 4 vols. (Rotterdam: Michel
 Böhm, 1720), all reference are to this edition; Bayle's Pensées diverses (1682 and
 83) and his Commentaire philosophique (1686) also gave rise to contention. For
 a systematic account of Bayle's life and thought, see E. Labrousse, Pierre Bayle ,
 2 vols. (La Haye: Mārtiņus Nijhoff, 1963-64); for reactions to Bayle's thought,
 see P. Rétat, Le «Dictionnaire» de Bayle et la lutte philosophique au XVIIIe siècle
 (Paris: Imprimerie Audin, 1971).
 5. The two expressions are used by Bayle in his Réponse aux questions d'un
 provincial (-RQP) 4 parts (1703-07), in Oeuvres diverses , 4 vols. (La Haye: par
 la Compagnie des Libraires, 1737), III: 766a-69a (§CXXXI). Jacques Basnage uses
 the same terminology to describe the dispute between Bayle and Jacquelot in his
 letter to J. -A. Turrettini, see Lettres inédites , 1:176; Rétat, Le « Dictionnaire » de
 Bayle y 15-60, traces the intellectual divisions in the Huguenot diaspora.
 6. The expression occurs in Aufrère's letter, cited n. 2 above.
 7. Rétat, Le « Dictionnaire » de Bayle , 353-441, traces the broad outline of Bayle's
 influence on the Encyclopédie. See also, C. Senofonte, Pierre Bayle dal calvinismo
 all'illuminismo (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1978).
 8. I refer to the articles «Manichéisme» (Yvon) and «Dieu» (Formey). On Yvon
 and Formey, see F.A. and S.L. Kafker, The Encyclopedists as individuals: a biogra-
 phical dictionary of the authors of the « Encyclopédie » (Oxford: The Voltaire Foun-
 dation, 1988), 140-44 and 403-06; Rétat, Le « Dictionnaire » de Bayle , 416-17 and 403-11.
 9. The quotation is from Kafker, The Encyclopedists as individuals , 404; accor-
 ding to Rétat, Le « Dictionnaire » de Bayle , 406-07, there is also a certain complicity
 with Bayle in Yvon' s use of the Dictioňnaire.
 10. The quotation is from J. Lough, The Encyclopédie (London: Longman, 1971),
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 Reason and belief: the Bayle-Jacquelot debate
 and, by implication, as to the validity of Christianity11. How, we may
 ask, did a debate concerning the nature of religious belief end in an implied
 rejection of that belief?
 In a sense - and from the beginning - the challenge to Christianity for-
 med an inherent part of the debate between Bayle and Jacquelot. On the
 one hand, Huguenot opposition to the tendentious articles in the
 Dictionnaire12 , established an image of Bayle as a «wry and frenzied unbe-
 liever»13, who, to quote Jacquelot, «s'est appliqué à ramasser des difficul-
 tez pour en couvrir & en accabler la Religion»14. On the other, Bayle repea-
 tedly argued that to seek to make Christianity compatible with reason would
 inevitably end at best in deism and at worst in pyrrhonism15. To the dispas-
 sionate onlooker, the charge of unavowed irreligion weighs more heavily
 against Bayle - a mischievous intellectual - than against the apologist and
 pastor Jacquelot. Bayle's insistence on the ultimate incomprehensibility of
 God and on the philosophical insolubility of the problem of evil is consistent
 with atheism, as his generation understood it16. However, while the possi-
 bility that Bayle is deliberately trying to undermine Christianity cannot be
 discounted, it is highly significant that the cross-reference to d'Alembert's
 article in the Encyclopédie links the debate with the philosophical question
 of the kind of proof appropriate in religious matters. As I shall argue, while
 Bayle is always provocative in his dispute with Jacquelot, the debate in essen-
 tially about the degree and kind of proof17 and consequently the degree and
 kind of certitude available to the believer.
 159, who is referring to the article «Démonstration» (d'Alembert), Encyclopédie ,
 IV: 822b-824a. D'Alembert is particularly sceptical about the metaphysical proofs
 of Christianity, although he is also very luke-warm in his reference to the historical
 proofs.
 11. See Rétat, Le «Dictionnaire» de Bayle , 402.
 12. The contentious articles are essentially «Manichéens», «Pauliciens», «Pyrr-
 hon» and, for Jacquelot, «Hélène» (free-will) and «Simonides» (God), although
 Jacquelot refers to a number of other articles in the course of the debate.
 13. Rétat, Le «Dictionnaire» de Bayle , 27 and 15-60.
 14. I. Jacquelot, Conformité de la foi avec la raison ; ou défense de la religion ,
 contre les principales difficultez répandues dans le «Dictionnaire historique et criti-
 que» de Mr. Bayle (Amsterdam: Henry Desbordes & Daniel Pain, 1705), [***V°],
 see also, 222.
 15. See Bayle Nouvelles de la république des lettres (=NRL), novembre 1684,
 art. 1, OD, I: 161a; and juillet 1686, art. 1, OD, I: 590b; Commentaire philosophi-
 que (-CP)t OD, II: 479a (part III, préface); Dictionnaire , «Nicolle».
 16. See Bayle, Dictionnaire , «Simonide», «Manichéens» and «Pauliciens»; La-
 brousse, Pierre Bayle , 2:346-86; A.C. Kors, Atheism in France 1650-1729: the ortho-
 dox sources of disbelief (Princeton: University Press), 44-80; G. Cantelli, Teologia
 e ateismo: saggio sul pensiero filosofico e religioso di Pierre Bayle (Firenze: La
 Nuova Italia, 1969); R. Whelan, «The wisdom of Simonides: Bayle and La Mothe
 Le Vayer», in Scepticism and irreligion (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 230-53.
 17. In fact, Jacquelot observes this himself, see his Examen de la theologie de
 Mr. Bayle (Amsterdam: François l'Honoré, 1706), 91 and 121.
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 Curiously, if Bayle and Jacqueloťs writings are read simultaneously ra-
 ther than in the sequence of their publication18, it is clear that the two
 thinkers agree substantially on a number of issues concerning the relation-
 ship or reason to belief19. Both men share an enthusiasm for - in Jac-
 queloťs terms - that «incomparable philosophe», namely Descartes»20.
 They both insist that the Cartesian or ontological proof of the existence
 of God is convincing21. Not only that, neither of them ever doubts the
 cogito , which Jacquelot extends to include the will - «je pense, je veux,
 donc je suis» - and which he praises as Descartes's chief contribution
 to philosophy22. Moreover, they both accept Cartesian dualism as a proof
 of the immateriality and, consequently, of the immortality of the soul23.
 This agreement on certain metaphysical principles finds a parallel in their
 18. The sequence of publication is as follows: Bayle, Dictionnaire , first edition
 (completed 1696, published Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1697); Jacquelot, Disserta-
 tions sur l'existence de Dieu (La Haye: Etienne Foulque, 1697); Bayle, Dictionnaire ,
 second edition (completed 1701, published Rotterdam; Reinier Leers, 1702) (with
 four «Eclaircissements» on atheism, obscenity, pyrrhonism and Manicheism); Jac-
 quelot, Conformité (completed 1704, published 1705); Bayle, RQP , part. II (Rotter-
 dam: Reinier Leers, 1705); Jacquelot, Examen (1706); a le, Entretiens de Maxime
 et de Thémiste (Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1707); Jacquelot, Réponse aux « Entre-
 tiens» co posez par Mr Bayle (Amsterdam: François L'Honoré, 1707). I have
 been unable to consult this last work by Jacquelot. I do not refer to Jacquelot,
 Dissertations sur le Messie (La Haye: François L'Honoré, 1699) or Traité de la
 vérité et de l'inspiration des livres du Vieux et du Nouveau Testament (Rotterdam:
 Gaspard Fritsch, 1715). Although they are not irrelevant, they are incidental to
 the main subject of the debate between Bayle and Jacquelot.
 19. Both thinkers refer to their shared views, see Bayle, RQP , part. 2, OD ,
 III: 761a and 795b-96a (§§CXXVIII and CXLIV); Jacquelot, Examen , 162. It is
 possible that this obvious agreement between the two men on a number of issues
 lent credence to the rumour that Jacqueloťs attack as motivated by self-interest
 (see E. Labrousse, Pierre Bayle , 1:261-62).
 20. Jacquelot, Dissertations , 329 and see 354; Labrousse, Pierre Bayle , 2: 153-256;
 G. Paganini, Analisi della fede e critica della ragione nella filosofìa di Pierre Bayle
 (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1980).
 21. Jacquelot, Dissertations , 139, 426-29, 459-460; Bayle, «Quomodo probatur
 ratione Deum existere», which is part of his «Synopsis metaphysicae», in his Sy stema
 totius philosphiae (the course he taug t at Sedan between 1675 a d 1677), OD,
 IV: 520-23. However, Jacquelot expresses reservations about the apologetic useful-
 ness of the ontological proof (see Dissertations , 428-29) and, as we shall see, Bayle's
 argument against Jacquelot is principally against the application of the Cartesian
 criterion of évidence to theology (see below). On Bayle's changing attitudes to De-
 scartes, see Labrousse, Pierre Ba le , 2:159.
 22. Jacquelot, Dissertations , 354-55; Conformité , 19-22, 141-142 and 358ff; for
 Bayle, see Labrousse, Pierre Bayle % 2: 159.
 23. Jacquelot, Dissertations , p. 351-96; Bayle, Dictionnaire , «Pomponace», foot-
 note F (see Whelan, «The wisdom of Simonides» for Bayle's qualification of his
 position).
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 ethical theory. The two men proclaim - Bayle more loudly than Jacquelot
 - that reason unaided by revelation, can discern a natural, moral law
 whose precepts are universally valid. Furthermore, both thinkers are agreed
 that, whether in the form of the Decalogue or the ethical teachings of
 the New Testament, revelation confirms and enhances but never contradicts
 this natural law24. Finally, although Jacquelot is more ambivalent here,
 both thinkers agree on the limitations of reason, affirming that the Chri-
 stian mysteries are incomprehensible and must be accepted on divine autho-
 rity, in other words, they must be believed because they are revealed25.
 This consensus between the two men is reflected in their comparable
 distinction of two kinds of proof, although they differ concerning the
 application of these proofs to religion. Firstly, both men argue that only
 mathematical or demonstrative proof yields absolute certainty because it
 is established on self-evident principles and therefore does not suffer
 contradiction26. Despite his reliance in practice on Descartes, and therefo-
 re on self-evident proof, Jacquelot maintains in theory that this kind of
 24. Jacquelot, Dissertations , 586; Conformité , 26, 43, 88, 131; for Bayle, see
 Labrousse, Pierre Bayle , 2:257-89.
 25. Both authors are agreed that the nature of God and the Trinity are incompre-
 hensible mysteries (Jacquelot, Dissertations , 417-18; Conformité , 75, 110; Examen ,
 111, 126, 424, 426; Bayle, Dictionnaire , «Pyrrhon», footnote B; «Simonides», foot-
 note F. RQP, part 2, OD , III: 766a-69a (§CXXXI). Jacquelot adds that the Resur-
 rection is also mysterious (i Conformité , 93); but Bayle is alone in insisting that
 the Incarnation and predestination must also be considered as mysteries (for reasons
 of ad hominem argument he also regards transsubstantiation as mysterious, see
 «Pyrrhon», footnote B). Jacquelot offers an explanation of the Incarnation by ana-
 logy with Cartesian dualism (see Conformité , 104-05 and 293; Examen , 427 -29),
 an argument which is also part of Bayle* s conceptual framework but which he
 does not argue dogmatically (see Dictionnaire , «Nestorius», footnote A, and R.
 Whelan, The Anatomy of superstition : a study of the historical theory and practice
 of Pierre Bayle (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1989), 35-36). But the heart
 of dispute his with Bayle turns on Jacquelot' s attempt to give a rational explanation
 to the problem of evil, which Bayle silences, rather than solves, by an appeal to
 the mystery of predestination and Jacquelot justifies by an appeal to human liberty
 (see below). However, where they agree on the nature of the Christian mysteries,
 both thinkers argue that the doctrines of Scripture must be accepted by faith alone
 (see Jacquelot, Dissertations , 644; Conformité , 88, 90, 110, 273, 282; Bayle, Diction-
 naire , «Pyrrhon», footnote C; «Eclaircissement sur les pyrrhoniens», IV:3001-07;
 RQP , part. 2, OD, III: 816b, 832b (§§CLII and CLVIII) and passim.
 26. Jacquelot, Dissertations , **r°; Examen 149; Bayle, «De principiis Cartesiano-
 rum», «Synopsis metaphysicae», in Systema totius philosophiae , OD , IV: 478-83;
 Dictionnaire , «Pyrrhon», footnote B. For Bayle' s qualifications concerning the ap-
 plicability of mathematical or demonstrative proof, see Whelan, «The wisdom of
 Simondies». Common examples of self-evident propositions are «the whole is greater
 than the part», or «que sunt idem uni tertie sunt idem inter se» («things identical
 to a third thing are identical to each other»).
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 certainty is not available in «les matières de Réligion»27. While Bayle
 agrees with Jacquelot as to detailed proof of various Christian doctrines,
 he affirms as a general principle that «nos veritez Théologiques» are based
 on «l'autorité de l'Etre infini qui ne peut tromper, ni être trompé», which
 is a self-evident principle28. Secondly, given that Christianity is a histori-
 cally revealed religion, both thinkers maintain that it is capable of the
 kind of proof appropriate to historical fact. In Bayle's terms, facts are
 susceptible to a «démonstration morale», or moral proof, which furnishes
 «une grande probabilité» or «une tres-grande probabilité»29. Probability
 is not, however, to be equated with uncertainty, since for Bayle moral
 is superior to demonstrative proof, inasmuch as historical facts - unlike
 self-evident principles - can be proven to exist outside of the mind30.
 Jacquelot is no less categoric. For him, religious proof is based on an
 «évidence d[e] témoignage», which constitutes «preuve[s] démonstrative [s]»
 of the truth of Christianity31. The terminology he uses to describe this
 kind of proof is important, since it indicates that he grants the kind of
 logical necessity (and therefore absolute certainty) to moral proof which
 is normally associated with self-evidence32.
 27. Jacquelot, Dissertations , Conformité , 118; this insistence may well
 result from Pascal's influence (see McKenna, De Pascal à Voltaire , 544-50), since
 Jacquelot also repeatedly opposes the «Dieu des philosophes to the Dieu d'Abra-
 ham» (see Dissertations y [**4r°], 2, 299, 592, 622-23; Conformité , 10, 81, 100, 117-18).
 28. Bayle, RQP , part 2, OD , III: 767a (§CXXXI).
 29. Bayle, Dictionnaire , «Beaulieu», footnote F, for the place of this in Bayle's
 thought, see Whelan, «The wisdom of Simonides».
 30. Bayle, «Dissertation contenant le projet», Dictionnaire , IV: 2983 (§IX).
 31. Jacquelot, Dissertations , 317; Examen. 160.
 32. On occasion Jacquelot does distinguish «témoignage», which yields probabili-
 ty, that is, «vrai-semblance» - to use the terminology of the time ( Conformité ,
 8, 273 and 282) - from mathematical proof. In the following passage, the distinc-
 tion is clear: «Que doit-on donc croire, quand on voit que les loix de Moyse renfer-
 ment plus de sagesse, plus d'équité & des maximes plus assûrées pour un bon gouver-
 nement, que ces loix des Grecs & des Romains? Ce n'est pas une démonstration
 mathématique de la divinité des loix de Moyse, je l'avoue, parce que le sujet n'en
 peut avoir: mais néanmoins c'est une preuve aussi concluante, & aussi forte pour
 nous convaincre, que les loix de Moyse tirent leur origine d'une autre source que
 de la raison humaine, que le seroit une démonstration dans toutes les formes»
 (Dissertation y 534).
 Elsewhere, however, as his terminology implies, Jacquelot conflates the proofs and
 the certainty they yield (see Dissertations , 2-3; «démonstration de l'existence de
 Dieu» from Scripture «pour faire sentir la nécessité de la conclusion»; see also,
 135, 141, 169, 313, 317, 509, 584, 592, 622, 623, 641, it is particularly clear in
 the Conformité that Jacquelot uses the same terminology to describe Cartesian or
 self-evident proof, see, for example, 276). His confusion may well be explained
 not simply by the hold Cartesianism had at the time but also by the publication
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 However, this systematic and brief presentation of the debate between
 the two thinkers is, in some respects, misleading, since it bestows more
 coherence on their views than is strictly allowable. In reality, Bayle and
 Jacquelot are keenly divided on two issues in philosophical theology, name-
 ly, the problem of evil and the related question of free will. In the Diction-
 naire and again in his reply to Jacquelot in the Réponse aux questions
 d'un provincial , Bayle creates a logical dilemma, higlighting a contradiction
 between philosophy and theology. It is self-evident that an infinitely perfect
 and omnipotent Being of necessity would have created people who are
 truly good. Experience teaches that human beings are not truly good, and
 revelation indicates that physical and moral evil were permitted by the
 Divinity. It follows, therefore, on the one hand, that the infinite Being
 is either not truly good or not all-powerful, or, on the other, that there
 are two superior Beings of equal power, one good, the other evil33. In
 reply, Jacqueloťs strongest argument is his insistence on free will as the
 cause of the Fall and the source of evil. To add weight to his position
 he tries to grant self-evidence, and therefore incontrovertible proof to the
 freedom of the will. That is to say, with his revision of the Cartesian
 cogito - «je pense, je veux, donc je suis» - he attempts to make our
 awareness of our freedom analogous to the self-evident proof of our
 existence34. However, in Bayle's view, just as the cogito proves our exi-
 stence but not our independence from another antecedent cause (namely
 God) so Jacqueloťs voluntarist cogito can prove the existence of the will,
 but not its independence from a higher cause which can, therefore, still
 be said to determine the activity of the will35. In other words, the debate
 between the two thinkers - despite Jacqueloťs unremitting opposition
 - only serves to demonstrate that, whether in the area of Christian theodi-
 cy or free will, self-evident propositions produce conclusions which are
 either inimical to Christianity or inconclusive if they are used to defend
 the tenets of revelation.
 In the light of the terms and conclusions of the debate between Bayle
 and Jacquelot, it is hardly surprising that opinion was, and is, so divided
 as to which thinker got the better of the argument. While Bayle surpasses
 history of Pascal's Pensées. The Port-Royal edition associates self-evident with mo-
 ral proofs, without appreciating the way in which this falsified Pascal's purpose
 (see McKenna De Pascal à Voltaire , 1:1-135). On the development of «vrai-semblance»
 and its relationship to Cartesianism, see C. Borghero, La Certezza e la storia : carte-
 sianismo, pironismo e conoscenza storica (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1983).
 33. See Bayle, Dictionnaire , «Manichéens», «Pauliciens», «Eclaircissement sur
 les Manichéens», and ROP , part 2, OD, III: 795b-798b (§CXLIV).
 34. See Jacquelot, Conformité 19-22, 141-42 and 358.
 35. See Bayle, RQP , part 2. OD, III: 785b (§CXL).
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 Jacquelot in logic and clarity of thought, he seems to have achieved some-
 thing of a Pyrrhic victory, that is to say, his onslaught on the so-called
 rationalist theologians appears to leave Christianity defenceless against the
 attack of the unbeliever. Nonetheless, Bayle repeatedly stated that he was
 concerned not to undermine «la doctrine de Mr Jaquelot» but merely Jac-
 queloťs apologetic use of Cartesian or self-evident proofs36. Given Bay-
 le's own enthusiasm for Descartes, this statement was read by Jacquelot
 as a philosophical sleight-of-hand, used by Bayle to disguise his own radical
 unbelief37. In my opinion, however, there are at least two reasons for
 taking Bayle's claim seriously. In the first place, it is no accident that
 Bayle began to question the applicability of the criterion of évidence to
 religious belief at the same time as he was developing his theory of
 toleration38. If religious belief is held to be self-evident, and therefore
 intellectually compelling, then the heretic or the unbeliever have no defensi-
 ble intellectual grounds for disagreeing with it. Whereas, if only moral
 arguments are adduced as proofs of belief, then deviancy is permissable,
 since moral proof is not incontrovertible. This is the key both to Bayle's
 clear distinction between demonstrative and moral proof and Jacquelot* s
 attribution of évidence even to the historical proofs for Christianity. As
 an apologist Jacquelot is concerned to make religious belief intellectually
 compelling39, while as a defender of toleration, Bayle is determined to
 deprive belief of its alleged self-evident character40. Unfortunately, as
 36. Bayle, RQP , part 2, OD , III: 786a (§CXL) and 832a (§CLVIII), compare
 these statements with Dictionnaire . «Nicolle». footnote C and «Pellisson», footnote D.
 37. Jacquelot, Conformité , 270.
 38. See references given n. 15 above; also Nouvelles lettres critiques sur l'histoire
 du calvinisme (1685), ODt II:117b-28b (Lettre IX); CP, OD, II: 484b: «la persecu-
 tion de Chretien à Chretien ne sauroit être qu'injuste, puisqu'ils n'ont point de
 raisons demonstratives qui leur apprennent infailliblement qui a tort, ou qui a rai-
 son» (Preface du Supplement au Commentaire philosophique). See S. O'Cathasaigh,
 «Skepticism and belief in Pierre Bayle' s Nouvelles lettres critiques », Journal of
 the history of philosophy , 45 (1984), 421-33.
 39. Jacquelot has an intellectualist epistemology of faith, inasmuch as he sees
 «persuasion» as the instrument of faith (while also allowing that grace has a role
 to play). In this he is probably influenced by Malebranche and most certainly by
 the theology of the Academy of Saumur, whose influence he acknowledges. For
 Jacquelot's epistemology, see Conformité , 158, 165, 271-72, 328; Examen , 13 and
 219; for the influence of Saumur, see Examen , 169-78; it is interesting to note
 that Jacquelot says he learnt his Arminian soteriology at the Academy of Saumur
 C Examen , 66). On Saumer, see B.G. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut heresy
 (Madison, Milwaukee and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969); F.
 Laplanche, Orthodoxie et prédication: l'oeuvre d' Amy raut et la querelle de la grâce
 universelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965) and L'Ecriture , le sacré
 et l'histoire: érudits et politiques protestants devant la Bible en France au XVIIe
 siècle (Amsterdam and Maarssen: APA-Holland University Press, 1986).
 40. For a fuller treatment of this, see Whelan, «The wisdom of Simonides».
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 Reason and belief: the Bayle-Jacquelot debate
 Jacquelot foresaw, this defence of the erring conscience ultimately worked
 against religious belief. Writers like d'Alembert - whose critical approach
 to revelation deprived the moral proofs of their power - were quick to
 conclude that there was no incontrovertible philosophical proof for
 Christianity41 .
 Nonetheless, let us not conclude too hastily that Bayle is alone responsi-
 ble, whether consciously or unconsciously, for the subsequent adaptation
 of his arguments to defend Enlightened unbelief. He had a second reason
 for criticising Jacqueloťs obsession with évidence. Exasperated by Bayle's
 arguments, Jacquelot finally abandoned his theoretical ambivalence towards
 self-evidence and stated categorically that «l'évidence [...] est [...] la seule
 marque que les hommes puissent avoir de la certitude de quelque cho-
 se»42. This exclusive insistence on self-evidence as a criterion actually re-
 legates revelation to a secondary position. To put it another way, revelation
 merely elaborates in story form truths which are available to reason, or,
 as Jacquelot expresses it, «la Religion Chrétienne n'est presque autre chose
 que le propre sentiment de la droite Raison, éclairée & soûtenuë de l'autori-
 té de Dieu»43. Bayle seems to have been very far-sighted, then, when he
 stated, as early as 1686, that to insist on évidence as a criterion would
 lead inevitably to deism44. Jacquelot may be convinced by the Christian
 story but more critical minds than his were soon to dismiss it as irrelevant,
 41. Rétat (Le «Dictionnaire» de Bayle , 402-03) rightly argues that d'Alembert^
 scepticism owes little or nothing to Bayle; nonetheless, the Bayle-Jacquelot debate
 was one of many raging between philosophical theologians of their time. The mutual
 refutation of each others proofs merely established for the next generation of thin-
 kers that all metaphysical proofs of the truth of Christianity were unreliable (on
 this, see Kors, Atheism in France).
 42. Jacquelot, Examen , 265. This open statement of the Cartesian presuppositions
 of his theology explains why, with the exception of the Trinity, he consistently
 tries to make Christian doctrine compatible with reason. In his view, if Christianity
 is found to be incompatible with self-evident principles, it is necessarily false.
 43. Jacquelot, Conformité , 111 and see Examen , 178-90.
 44. Bayle, NRL , novembre 1684, art. 1, OD , I: 161a: «Il faut donc que Ton
 avoue, que Dieu n'exige point des ignorans, qu'ils connoissent l'infaillibilité de l'E-
 glise, par un examen de l'Ecriture accompagné de toutes les lumieres, & de toutes
 les recherches dont parle M. Nicolle. Il a trop consulté ici son M. Descartes, qui
 lui a appris qu'on agit temerairement lors même que l'on croit la vérité, si on
 la croit avant que de s'en être convaincu par démonstration. On ne peut pas faire
 un plus grand abus de la maxime de ce Philosophe, que de la pousser jusques
 aux matieres de conscience; ce seroit même aller contre son esprit, car il vouloit
 que dans les choses de pratique on se déterminât sur la plus grande probabilité.
 Ce principe de Philosophie seroit «l'éponge de toutes les Religions». This passage
 is linked by a cross-reference in the Dictionnaire , «Nicolle», footnote C(ll) and
 (12), with the review in July 1686, art. 1 (NRL, OD> I: 590b: «Comme je l'ai
 déjà dit ailleurs, c'est travailler pour le Déisme, & non pas pour le Catholicisme».
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 110
 choosing to follow instead «le sentiment de la droite Raison»45. Bayle's
 perception of the ultimate consequences of Jacquelot' s apologetics helps
 to clarify his insistence that the highest use of reason is to abandon
 reason46. Unlike Jacquelot, he appreciated that reason is a critical rather
 than a creative tool47: it might begin as an ally, but it would end as an
 enemy of belief. In a word, the Bayle- Jacquelot debate, like those between
 other philosophical theologians of their time48, is more of an intellectual
 fratricide than a difference of opinion. Far from holding incredulity at
 bay, it laid foundations for the belief and unbelief of the Enlightenment.
 45. On this see R. Whelan, «From Christian apologetics to Englightened deism:
 the case of Jacques Abbadie (1656-1727)», Modern language review , 87 (1992),
 32-40; see also, A. McKenna, «Deus absconditus : quelques reflexions sur la crise
 du rationalisme chrétien entre 1670 et 1740», in C. Pitassi (ed.), Apologétique 1680-
 1740: sauvetage ou naufrage de la théologie? (Genève: Labor et Fides, 1991), 13-28.
 46. Bayle, Dictionnaire , «Pyrrhon», footnote C and «Simonides», footnote F,
 «Eclaircissement sur les Pyrrhoniens» and RQP ; OD , III: passim .
 47. See Bayle, Dictionnaire , «Acosta», footnote G.
 48. See Kors, Atheism in France , passim .
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